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Rare earth → magnet chain · BACI 2010–2024

If China stopped exporting rare earths, who runs short, and who could fill the gap?

For each Western and allied importer, the share of its imports at one stage of the chain that would disappear. It counts Chinese shipments and Chinese content that reaches the importer through third countries (one hop). Non-Chinese suppliers can refill the gap only up to what they now sell outside the West, net of their own Chinese content.

Exploratory · accounting on observed trade, not a forecast
Who counts as "the West"
Stage of the chain
S1 · ores: not rare-earth-specific (catch-all code HS 2530.90)
The network the cut-off is applied to.
Share of its exports of this stage that China stops.
0% = direct embargo only. 100% = Chinese content in other countries' exports is stopped too.

Default 0%: when Chinese supply fell in 2010–2024, other suppliers did not make up the difference. Anything above the green ceiling is capped.
Measure
Chinese content of third countries
Scenarios

Click a country for its file. Small states are easier to pick in the Europe view or in the list.

How the numbers are built

The gap

For importer i at one stage and year, with wj the share of its imports from partner j:

direct D = w(China) via hubs H = Σ w(j) × c(j) j ≠ China gap = (cut·D + cut·reach·H) × (1 − refill)

c(j), the Chinese content of partner j's exports, is proxied by j's own import share from China: at the same stage (re-export) or the stage before (the partner processes Chinese inputs). "Larger of the two" is the upper bound.

The refill ceiling

avail(k) = X(k → outside the West) × (1 − cut·reach·c(k)) pool = Σ avail(k) ceiling = pool / Σ gap(bloc)

Only supply that now goes somewhere else can be diverted: shipments between Western countries add nothing to the bloc. China is a destination like any other, so ore and carbonate now sold to Chinese refiners count. Here c(k) is capped by mass balance: k cannot ship more Chinese material than it imports from China (a magnet is taken as 30% rare earth by weight). The bloc is set by the West switch at the top: by default the USA, Japan and EU27 (extra-EU trade only); the alternative is the wider West of 38 countries (EU27 extra-EU plus ten non-EU importers). Exports to countries outside the chosen West count as divertible. The ceiling is shared pro rata.

Coverage of China's direct sales = pool ÷ (cut × China's direct sales to the bloc), not capped at 100%. At the defaults (100%, 100%, larger of the two, tonnes, 2024, default West) it is the figure in coverage_split_2012_2024.csv.

Screens and exclusions

  • Flows priced under 10% of the world unit value of their HS line and year are dropped as recording errors (for example 40,700 t of compounds from Türkiye to Benin at $0.05/kg).
  • Flows priced at 10–50% are left out of the pool unless "Count low-priced flows" is ticked. The largest is Australia → Malaysia "metals" (31,000 t at about a third of the metals price): Lynas feed for its Malaysian plant, probably an intermediate coded as metal.

What it leaves out

  • Producers among the hubs. In the gap, a partner that mines or refines at home is treated as if its exports had the same Chinese share as its imports. This overstates the via-hub channel for producers.
  • Production not traded today. New mines, idle plants and stockpiles are outside trade data. The ceiling covers diversion of existing trade within one year.
  • Processing. Ore or mixed carbonate diverted from China still needs separation, metal-making and magnet plants outside China. A compounds surplus does not refill a metals or magnets gap.
  • Prices and stocks. Volumes only; inventories and contract lags would delay the gap.

Data

  • CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2010–2024; tonnes are the main measure (the 2011 price spike distorts values).
  • Stages: S2 compounds 2846.10 + 2846.90, S3 metals 2805.30, S4 magnets 8505.11. 8505.11 is all permanent metal magnets; in EU detail only about 55–63% by weight are rare-earth magnets.
  • Member states include imports from other members, so Germany or the Netherlands act as hubs for them. The UK is its own importer. Taiwan is BACI's "Other Asia, nes".