China’s share of EU imports of natural graphite drops, and stays down.
The share of EU texts that say Europe depends on China, without naming any step of the chain, doubles, and stays up.
Pillar 1 followed the goods. Pillar 2 followed the words. This page puts the two side by side, month by month, and asks which one moves first.
Coincidence?
We used the same tool on both sides: it looks for lasting shifts, months when a line settles at a new level and stays there, and ignores one-off spikes.
Tap the chart where you think China’s share of EU graphite imports shifted for good. Up to three taps.
Look for a new level that lasts at least six months, not a single spike.
Share of the value of EU imports from outside the EU that comes from China, by month (CN 2504.10)
Trade: Eurostat Comext DS-045409, EU27 imports from outside the EU, Feb 2022 – Jul 2026 · Talk: Pillar 2 corpus, adjusted for coding errors
When both move, which one moves first?
Refining is where China’s first graphite licences bit. We compare how often EU texts name refining as the dependency with China’s share of EU imports of artificial graphite, a refined product.
Top: % of paragraphs naming refining as Europe’s dependency · Bottom: China’s share of EU imports of artificial graphite (CN 3801.10)
Talk shifts are provisional (still under review) · Comext DS-045409
Two lines, four and a half years. Above, how often EU texts say Europe depends on China for refining. Below, China’s share of what the EU imports of artificial graphite.
China starts requiring export licences for graphite. Let’s zoom in on the months around it.
Refining claims settle at a lower level: from about 3.3% to 1.0% of paragraphs. The burst of coverage around the licences is over, and talk moves on.
China’s share of artificial-graphite imports drops from about 76% to 64%, and stays there. Both methods we use agree on this one.
Two months apart.
Neither led. The simplest reading: both were reacting to the same shock, the licences.
A tie. Then came March 2025.
The biggest shift in our talk data, set against the clearest shift in our trade data.
Top two: % of paragraphs claiming dependency without naming a step · Bottom: China’s share of EU imports of natural graphite (CN 2504.10)
Talk shifts are provisional (still under review) · Comext DS-045409
From mid-2024 to mid-2026. At the bottom, China’s share of EU imports of natural graphite.
China’s share falls from about 53% to 38%, and stays down. Two other graphite lines break in the very same month.
Three months later, claims that name no step jump from 8% to 17% of paragraphs.
Seven months later, the press follows, in the month of China’s controls on battery components: from about 4% to 16% for six months, then easing to about 9%.
Did trade wake Europe up?
On this round, trade moved first. It is tempting to stop here.
What would pure chance give you?
Before we say trade woke Europe up, one test: would random dates line up just as well? Two quick experiments.
■ Lasting shifts in China’s share of EU imports of anode-grade graphite. Shaded: every month within a year of one of them, where a talk shift would count as a “match”.
Comext DS-045409 · 2504.10 at ≥ €3,700/t · Feb 2022 – Sep 2026
● A trade shift on the matching line came within a year. ○ None did.
Random dates keep each line’s number of shifts, at least six months apart · each talk shift is checked against the trade line for the same step
On 9 Oct 2025 China aimed at components, including artificial-graphite anode material. Four weeks later it suspended the controls for a year.
Top: % of press paragraphs claiming dependency without naming a step · Bottom: China’s share of EU imports of artificial graphite (CN 3801.10)
Trade data end in Jul 2026; the last three months are provisional · Comext DS-045409