Orange rings on the map mark the 17 countries with a card. Click a ring, or pick a name below.
processor
China
- Number 1
- net importer of rare-earth compounds: 76,746 t imported vs 41,615 t exported, net −35,131 t (china_net_trade_by_stage.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- net exporter of magnets: 141,823 t exported vs 2,733 t imported, net +139,090 t (china_net_trade_by_stage.csv, 2024, tonnes)
China now buys rare-earth compounds abroad, mostly from Myanmar, refines them at home and sells magnets to the world: the monopoly moved up the chain instead of ending.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (china_net_trade_by_stage.csv); Reuters (2021) on Myanmar feedstock; see The two monopolies.
buyer
Japan
- Number 1
- direct dependence on China for magnets: 36.5% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- one-hop dependence for magnets: 67.8% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Japan almost halved its direct reliance on Chinese magnets after the 2010 shipment halt, but 73% of its hidden dependence now runs through Vietnam.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (one_hop_dependence.csv, top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv); for the 2010 shipment halt, Associated Press (24 September 2010) and Al Jazeera (24 September 2010), and John Seaman, Ifri/CIGS (October 2012) for Japan's 82% share of rare-earth imports from China in 2010; for Japan in 2026, MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 of 2026 and Fastmarkets (6 October 2026); see One hop away.
buyer
USA
- Number 1
- direct dependence on China for magnets: 76.9% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- one-hop dependence for magnets: 92.7% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
The US buys 77% of its magnets directly from China, 93% counting one hop; in June 2026 Beijing put Mountain Pass operator MP Materials on its export control list.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (one_hop_dependence.csv, top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv); MOFCOM Announcement No. 23 of 2026 (22 June 2026) and Al Jazeera (22 June 2026) on the export control list; Hansen Tobin, CSIS (2020) on Mountain Pass.
buyer
EU27 (Germany as the example)
- Number 1
- direct dependence on China for magnets, extra-EU imports: 90.8% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- one-hop dependence for magnets: 96.6% (one_hop_dependence.csv, 2024, tonnes)
The EU buys 91% of its magnets directly from China; Germany alone takes 84% of its magnet imports from China and passes some on to the US.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (one_hop_dependence.csv, top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv; EU27 table, and Germany in the USA table).
hub
Vietnam
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 86.7% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for Japan (#1, 73.1% of Japan's one-hop gap) and the EU27 (#3, 13.3%) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Vietnam supplies about a quarter of Japan's magnets but buys 87% of its own from China: Japan's diversification after 2010 largely runs back to China.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv); see One hop away.
supplier
Myanmar
- Number 1
- share of China's compound imports: 57.8% by weight, 59.5% by value (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- could cover 162% of China's compound sales to the West (44,348 t), but all of it now goes to China (coverage_split_2012_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Myanmar supplies the feedstock China's refiners need: more than half of China's imported compounds, so the mining happens abroad while the refining stays in China.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, coverage_split_2012_2024.csv); Reuters (2021) on Myanmar feedstock; see Sovereignty on paper.
hub
Indonesia
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 83.2% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the USA (#1, 15.4% of the US one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Indonesia is the largest hidden channel for US magnets: it supplies about 3% of US imports but buys 83% of its own magnets from China.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
hub
Mexico
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 79.3% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the USA (#3, 11.9% of the US one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Mexico supplies about 2% of US magnet imports and buys 79% of its own magnets from China, adding a hidden Chinese layer next door to the US.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
supplier
Malaysia
- Number 1
- share of China's compound imports: 20.8% by weight, 14.6% by value (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- could cover 16.0% of China's compound sales to the West (4,360 t), but 3,717 t of that now goes to China (coverage_split_2012_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Malaysia sells compounds to China and magnets to Japan; most of what it could offer the West instead now goes to Chinese refiners.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, coverage_split_2012_2024.csv, top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv); see Sovereignty on paper.
supplier
Laos
- Number 1
- share of China's compound imports: 14.0% by weight, 18.9% by value (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- could cover 38.5% of China's compound sales to the West (10,518 t), but all of it now goes to China (coverage_split_2012_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Laos is China's third-largest foreign source of rare-earth compounds, and all its compound exports outside the West go to Chinese refiners.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv, coverage_split_2012_2024.csv); see Sovereignty on paper.
hub
Philippines
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 9.9% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for Japan (#2, 9.0% of Japan's one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
The Philippines supplies 28.5% of Japan's magnets but buys only 10% of its own magnets from China, a rare low-China hub at the magnet stage.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
hub
Taiwan
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 96.3% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes; BACI name "Other Asia, nes", code 490)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the USA (#4, 10.2% of the US one-hop gap) and Japan (#5, 2.5%) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Taiwan buys 96% of its magnets from China, the highest share among the hubs, and passes part of that dependence on to the US and Japan.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
hub
South Korea
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 90.1% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the EU27 (#4, 8.4% of the EU one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
South Korea buys 90% of its magnets from China and sells some on to Europe, where it is the fourth-largest hidden channel.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
hub
UK
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 85.6% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the EU27 (#1, 19.3% of the EU one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
The UK is the largest hidden channel for EU magnet imports: it supplies about 1% of them but buys 86% of its own magnets from China.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
hub
Switzerland
- Number 1
- own dependence on China for magnets: 71.0% (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, D_j, 2024, tonnes)
- Number 2
- top-5 hub: yes, for the EU27 (#2, 18.1% of the EU one-hop gap) (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv, 2024, tonnes)
Switzerland supplies about 1.5% of EU magnet imports and buys 71% of its own magnets from China, making it the EU's second-largest hidden channel.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024, tonnes (top5_gap_contributors_2024.csv).
supplier
Australia
- Number 1
- mine production of 29,000 t of rare-earth oxide in 2025, the same as in 2024 (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths, p. 153). Its exports to China appear only under the ore codes (S1), which we do not use because HS 2530.90 is a catch-all mineral line (see Methods & limits).
- Number 2
- reserves of 6,300,000 t of rare-earth oxide, of which 3.3 million t meet the Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) standard or equivalent (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths, p. 153). It sold no rare-earth compounds (S2) to China in 2024, so it has no compound coverage figure.
Australia's shipments to China show up only under a catch-all ore code that our data cannot separate from other minerals, so its rare-earth role needs another source.
Source: group calculation from CEPII BACI HS92 V202601, 2024 (china_imports_by_stage_partner.csv); USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths, p. 153; the ore code HS 2530.90 is a catch-all line (see Methods & limits).
supplier
Brazil
- Number 1
- Serra Verde's ten-year offtake deals with Chinese buyers, cut short in December 2025 to end in 2026 (Reuters, 4 December 2025)
- Number 2
- USA Rare Earth bought Serra Verde for about US$2.8 bn; the deal closed on 3 September 2026 (USA Rare Earth press release, 4 September 2026)
Brazil's only commercial rare-earth mine, Serra Verde in Goiás, swapped Chinese buyers for a US-backed one, and Lula's new law now lets Brasília vet such deals.
Source: Reuters (4 December 2025) on Serra Verde's Chinese offtake contracts; USA Rare Earth's releases of 20 April 2026 and 4 September 2026 (SEC filings, Exhibit 99.1) on the deal and its closing on 3 September; Agência Brasil (17 September 2026) on Brazil's critical-minerals law; see Who can be sovereign?.
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